{"id":1637,"date":"2021-02-12T16:59:39","date_gmt":"2021-02-13T00:59:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.new.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/?p=1637"},"modified":"2021-02-12T16:59:39","modified_gmt":"2021-02-13T00:59:39","slug":"perpetrators-in-the-artsakh-conflict","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/perpetrators-in-the-artsakh-conflict\/","title":{"rendered":"Perpetrators in the Artsakh Conflict"},"content":{"rendered":"

Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights identified perpetrators of the conflict in Artsakh<\/a>, highlighting: (i) mercenary leaders hired and supported by Turkey; (ii) Turkish commanders overseeing and advising the operations; and (iii) Azerbaijani military actors commanding soldiers and mercenaries. It also establishes connections between the groups. Sources are hyperlinked, so readers can access additional sources.<\/p>\n

Jihadi Mercenary Leaders<\/strong><\/u><\/h3>\n

1.\u00a0Sayf Balud<\/em>, also known as\u00a0Sayf Abu Bakr<\/a>\u00a0(Twitter account<\/a>)<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Balud has been the leader of the Syrian National Army (SNA)\u2019s Hamza Division since\u00a02016<\/a>, which participated in\u00a0Operation Olive Branch<\/a>\u00a0(Afrin) and more recently the\u00a0Libyan Civil War<\/a>, both with\u00a0Turkish patronage<\/a>. He and approximately 500 of his men were\u00a0reportedly<\/a>\u00a0flown to Azerbaijan to join fighting in Artsakh. Balud is a\u00a0Syrian Turkman<\/a>, an ethnic characteristic that often enhances Turkish trust in \u201csensitive\u201d operations (such as recent proxy conflicts). In 2013,\u00a0he appeared in an ISIS propaganda video<\/a>. Balud and his division have been responsible for multiple war crimes, including\u00a0kidnapping Kurdish women<\/a>\u00a0and brutal repression in Afrin. He is one of Turkey\u2019s most\u00a0trusted and supported<\/a>\u00a0mercenary leaders.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Jamestown Foundation<\/a>;\u00a0Naharnet<\/a>;\u00a0Middle East Eye<\/a>;\u00a0USC-Dornsife Institute of Armenian Studies<\/a>\u00a0(IAS);\u00a0Daily Beast<\/a>;\u00a0Guardian<\/a>;\u00a0Aymenn Jawadd<\/a>;\u00a0National Post<\/a>;\u00a0Kurdistan24<\/a>;\u00a0ArmenPress<\/a><\/p>\n

2.\u00a0Fehim Isa<\/em>, possibly also known as\u00a0Isa al-Turkmani<\/a>\u00a0(Twitter account<\/a>)<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Isa has led the SNA\u2019s Sultan Murad Division since at least\u00a02015<\/a>, through which he has been directly involved in\u00a0Operation Euphrates Shield<\/a>,\u00a0Operation Olive Branch<\/a>, and the\u00a0Libyan Civil War<\/a>. Like Balud, he has enjoyed\u00a0Turkish patronage<\/a>\u00a0and is an\u00a0ethnic Turkman<\/a>. According to reports, he and his division have also\u00a0engaged in Artsakh<\/a>\u00a0with support from Turkey. There were rumors of Isa\u2019s resignation in 2017, however by early 2018 he was\u00a0confirmed<\/a>\u00a0as Sultan Murad\u2019s commander. He and his division have also been accused of multiple war crimes, such as the\u00a0torturing<\/a>\u00a0of Kurdish soldiers and\u00a0indiscriminate shelling<\/a>\u00a0of civilians.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Reuters<\/a>\u00a0(1);\u00a0Sultan Murad Division website<\/a>\u00a0(1);\u00a0ISW<\/a>;\u00a0al-Monitor<\/a>;\u00a0Independent<\/a>;\u00a0IAS<\/a>;\u00a0Daily Beast<\/a>;\u00a0Reuters<\/a>\u00a0(2);\u00a0Guardian<\/a>;\u00a0Sultan Murad Division Website<\/a>\u00a0(2);\u00a0AraNews<\/a>;\u00a0Amnesty International<\/a>;\u00a0Rudaw<\/a><\/p>\n

3.\u00a0Abu Amsha<\/em>, real name\u00a0Muhammad al-Jassim<\/a><\/strong><\/h4>\n

Amsha is the leader of the Suleyman Shah Brigade, nicknamed the al-Amshat militia, which gained prominence ~2018 as one of the\u00a0most brutal factions<\/a>\u00a0occupying Afrin with Turkish support. In Afrin, al-Amshat supposedly\u00a0confiscated property<\/a>,\u00a0kidnapped<\/a>\u00a0individuals for ransom,\u00a0looted, raped, and murdered<\/a>. Amsha has been directly implicated in these war crimes,\u00a0making 12 million dollars in a year<\/a>\u00a0from ransoms. He was also\u00a0accused of rape and murder<\/a>.\u00a0Turkish protection<\/a>\u00a0has reportedly allowed him to avoid punishment for these acts. He is also a\u00a0Syrian Turkman<\/a>, like Isa and Balud. Following Afrin, Amsha has also been an\u00a0important recruiter<\/a>\u00a0for Turkish-backed mercenaries in\u00a0Libya<\/a>, and he and his division have\u00a0fought in Artsakh<\/a>\u00a0at Turkey’s request.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0VDC-NSY<\/a>;\u00a0Lindsey Snell on Twitter<\/a>;\u00a0Kurdistan24<\/a>; SyriaHR (1<\/a>,\u00a02<\/a>,\u00a03<\/a>);\u00a0AfrinPost<\/a>;\u00a0Independent<\/a>;\u00a0ISPI<\/a>;\u00a0Asia News<\/a><\/p>\n

4. Others (no direct link to Artsakh, but to the organizations fighting there)<\/strong><\/h4>\n

a.\u00a0Ahmed Osman<\/em>, another\u00a0military leader<\/a>\u00a0of the Sultan Murad Division who was involved in\u00a0Operation Euphrates Shield<\/a>,\u00a0Operation Olive Branch<\/a>, and the\u00a0Libyan Civil War<\/a>.<\/p>\n

b.\u00a0Abu Jalal<\/em>, once a\u00a0military leader<\/a>\u00a0of the Hamza Division; current status unknown.<\/p>\n

c.\u00a0Hasan Abdullah Kulli<\/em>,\u00a0leader of the Kurdish Falcons Brigade<\/a>\u00a0of the Hamza Division. Kulli served in Afrin as a\u00a0translator<\/a>.<\/p>\n

d.\u00a0Mohammad al-Abdullah<\/em>,\u00a0described in 2016<\/a>\u00a0as the Hamza Division\u2019s \u201cHead of Political Bureau\u201d.<\/p>\n

e.\u00a0Fadlallah al-Haji<\/em>, a\u00a0Turkish prot\u00e9g\u00e9<\/a>\u00a0and head of Faylaq al-Sham, an important Turkish proxy\u00a0fighting in Syria, Libya, and Artsakh<\/a>. Al-Haji and his men have\u00a0connections<\/a>\u00a0to the Muslim Brotherhood and\u00a0fought with al-Qaeda<\/a>\u00a0in Idlib. He reportedly\u00a0resigned<\/a>\u00a0in November 2020.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0OHCHR<\/a>;\u00a0VOA News<\/a>;\u00a0al-Monitor<\/a>;\u00a0RFS Media Office<\/a>;\u00a0Middle East Eye<\/a>;\u00a0Zaman Al Wasl<\/a>;\u00a0Arab Weekly<\/a>;\u00a0Barrons<\/a>;\u00a0Washington Institute<\/a><\/p>\n

Turkish Commanders and Other Personnel<\/u><\/strong><\/h3>\n

1. Major General\u00a0Bahtiyar Ersay<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n

Ersay, whose\u00a0title<\/a>\u00a0is officially \u201cChief of the Operations Directorate of the Land Forces of Turkey,\u201d\u00a0oversaw<\/a>\u00a0the Azerbaijani General Staff in Artsakh following the\u00a0sacking of former Azerbaijani Chief of Staff Najmeddin Sadikov<\/a>. He previously led the\u00a02nd Commando Brigade<\/a>\u00a0against the PKK, which was\u00a0notoriously cruel<\/a>\u00a0against Kurdish civilians and soldiers (and contained Grey Wolves elements). Ersay was also involved in\u00a0Syria<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Libya<\/a>, potentially recruiting and overseeing the mercenaries<\/a>\u00a0that fought there. Because of this and his commando past, he is likely the Turkish commander most directly involved with these jihadi mercenaries. Ersay was also implicated in\u00a0Operation Sledgehammer<\/a>, an early-2000s coup attempt against Erdogan. He was\u00a0released without serving much of his sentence<\/a>\u00a0and the facts of his case remain unclear.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Memri<\/a>;\u00a0OSCE<\/a>;\u00a0Asbarez<\/a>;\u00a0Hurriyet<\/a><\/p>\n

2. Lieutenant General\u00a0\u015eeref \u00d6ngay<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n

\u00d6ngay is the\u00a0Commander of the Third Army of the Turkish Ground Forces<\/a>. While there is little information about his past, \u00d6ngay had his\u00a0contract extended<\/a>\u00a0at a time when Erdogan was purging the military, which implies trust from and loyalty to the higher-ups. The Armenian delegation at\u00a0OSCE<\/a>\u00a0say he \u201ctook part in planning and conducting\u201d Artsakh operations. He was also\u00a0spotted in Azerbaijan<\/a>\u00a0on 4 September 2020 planning joint operations with the Azerbaijani military.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Atalayar<\/a>;\u00a0OSCE<\/a>;\u00a0Turan<\/a>;\u00a0Memri<\/a><\/p>\n

3. Major General\u00a0G\u00f6ksel Kahya<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n

Kahya is an important Turkish drone commander who heads the\u00a0Turkish Air Force\u2019s 1st Supply and Maintenance Center<\/a>. Prior to the Artsakh conflict, he\u00a0deployed Turkish<\/a>\u00a0of Bayraktar TB2 drones in the Libyan Civil War. This drone expertise was then\u00a0shifted to Azerbaijan<\/a>, where he has resided since July 2020 and\u00a0oversaw<\/a>\u00a0the well-documented\u00a0use of TB2 drones<\/a>. These drones both were\u00a0instrumental<\/a>\u00a0for the Azerbaijani victory in the conflict and the cause of\u00a0devastating human rights<\/a>\u00a0against civilians, especially at night.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Memri<\/a>;\u00a0al-Marsad<\/a>;\u00a0Geopolitical Cyprus<\/a>\u00a0(translated);\u00a0OSCE<\/a>;\u00a0CSIS<\/a>;\u00a0Human Rights Defender of Armenia<\/a>;\u00a0Washington Post<\/a><\/p>\n

4.\u00a0Adnan Tanr\u0131verdi<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n

Tanr\u0131verdi is a retired Turkish general and the founder of\u00a0SADAT Inc.<\/a>\u00a0International Defense Consultancy, a private defense contracting company started in 2012. He was forced to resign from the military in\u00a01996<\/a>\u00a0due to Islamist affiliations and has filled SADAT with\u00a0other hardline Islamists<\/a>. Tanr\u0131verdi has significant influence over Erdogan, allegedly using SADAT against the alleged\u00a0coup in 2016<\/a>, and\u00a0helping re-organize<\/a>\u00a0and purge the Turkish Armed Forces. As a result, SADAT has been referred to as a\u00a0shadow military<\/a>. Reportedly, he and SADAT have played an important role in recruiting, equipping, and transporting about 3,000\u00a0Syrian mercenaries<\/a>\u00a0to both Libya and\u00a0Artsakh<\/a>. Importantly, SADAT is also the primary organization\u00a0training\u00a0<\/a>these Turkish-backed mercenary proxies. Though he lacks any official position in the Turkish government\/military, his\u00a0influence is significant<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0SADAT website<\/a>;\u00a0SOFREP<\/a>;\u00a0Duvar English<\/a>;\u00a0Ahval<\/a>;\u00a0Atalayar<\/a>;\u00a0al-Monitor<\/a><\/p>\n

For more information about SADAT, Turkey, and SNA proxy fighters in Artsakh and elsewhere, read\u00a0this research report<\/a>\u00a0by the JISS on the subject.\u00a0(This research was jointly initiated by JISS in Israel and Trends in the UAE, a first joint effort toward implementing the Abraham Accords between Israel and a number of key Arab nations.)<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Azerbaijani Commanders<\/strong><\/u><\/h3>\n

1. Major General\u00a0Hikmat Hasanov<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n

Hasanov is the\u00a0Commander of the 1st Army Corps of Azerbaijan<\/a>, which covered the northern frontline of the Artsakh conflict. He was\u00a0instrumental<\/a>\u00a0in capturing Suqovu\u015fan and other northern targets early in the war.\u00a0Multi-lingual and well-travelled<\/a>, Hasanov is a member of a\u00a0younger generation<\/a>\u00a0of Azerbaijani generals who lack connections to the former Soviet Union, which has allowed him to rise in the ranks as pro-Russian generals (e.g., Sadikov) were removed from their posts. He was also an\u00a0important commander<\/a>\u00a0in the 2016 Artsakh conflict.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Jamestown Institute<\/a>;\u00a0AzVision<\/a>\u00a0(translated)<\/p>\n

2. Major General\u00a0Mais Barkhudarov<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n

Barkhudarov is the\u00a0Commander of the 2nd Army Corps of Azerbaijan<\/a>, which covered the southern frontline in the Artsakh conflict. Along with Hikmat Mirzayev (see below), he was\u00a0instrumental<\/a>\u00a0in capturing Jabrayil. Like Hasanov, he is a member of the\u00a0younger generation<\/a>\u00a0of Azerbaijani generals. Barkhudarov was an important commander in the\u00a02016 Artsakh conflict<\/a>\u00a0as well, during which he helped capture\u00a0Lalatapa Heights<\/a>. The Azerbaijani press has glorified his role \u2013 see\u00a0here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Jamestown Institute<\/a>;\u00a0Press Service of the President of Azerbaijan<\/a>;\u00a0Azxeber<\/a>\u00a0(translated)<\/p>\n

3. Lieutenant General\u00a0Hikmat Mirzayev<\/em><\/strong><\/h4>\n

Mirzayev is the\u00a0highest-ranking<\/a>\u00a0of the three generals mentioned here and is the\u00a0head of the Azerbaijani special forces<\/a>, which were instrumental in their country\u2019s success in the\u00a02016<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a02020<\/a>\u00a0wars. Many special forces members were also\u00a0trained by Turkey<\/a>, and therefore Mirzayev has likely worked with the Turkish high command in the past. With Turkish backing, special forces were also\u00a0utilized much more<\/a>\u00a0in 2020. Following the recent conflict, Mirzayev was\u00a0promoted to Lieutenant General<\/a>. It is unclear what generation of commanders he is from; however, he is clearly in good standing with both the Turks and Azerbaijanis.<\/p>\n

Sources and additional reading:\u00a0Azerbaycan24<\/a>\u00a0(1);\u00a0Azerbaycan24<\/a>\u00a0(2, translated);\u00a0RadioFreeEurope<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights identified perpetrators of the conflict in…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1638,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"cybocfi_hide_featured_image":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1637","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"featured_image_urls":{"full":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg",600,338,false],"thumbnail":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries-150x150.jpg",150,150,true],"medium":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries-300x169.jpg",250,141,true],"medium_large":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg",600,338,false],"large":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries-500x282.jpg",400,226,true],"1536x1536":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg",600,338,false],"2048x2048":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg",600,338,false],"covernews-slider-full":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg",600,338,false],"covernews-slider-center":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg",600,338,false],"covernews-featured":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg",600,338,false],"covernews-medium":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries-540x338.jpg",540,338,true],"covernews-medium-square":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries-400x250.jpg",400,250,true],"rpwe-thumbnail":["https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries-45x45.jpg",45,45,true]},"author_info":{"display_name":"ArmenianCouncil","author_link":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/author\/armeniancouncil\/"},"category_info":"News<\/a>","tag_info":"News","comment_count":0,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/jihadist-merceneries.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1637","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1637"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1637\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1638"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1637"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1637"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.armeniancouncil.org\/ACA\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1637"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}